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COLLATERAL ATTACK BY HABEAS CORPUS IN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTIONS
State ex rel. Treat v. Alvis, Warden
(Crim. No. 203,126, C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, Jan. 12, 1959)
The plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Common
Pleas Court of Franklin County, Ohio, on January 12, 1959. He had been
indicted in two cases on June 23, 1950, both under section 2903.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code entitled "Assault upon a child under sixteen years."'
On arraignment, he pleaded "not guilty" to each charge. Upon trial of one
of these cases on November 10, 1950, he was found "guilty" and eventually
sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary. In December of 1957, he was "parolled";
however, this was of little significance since on June 29, 1954, more than
four years after the indictment, he had been tried on the second charge and
again found "guilty," sentence to "begin after the expiration of his current
confinement. ' 2 Thus, he immediately began serving the sentence in the
second case upon his "parol" in the first case.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution3 and article one, section ten of the Ohio Constitution4
have long guaranteed a speedy trial to those accused of a crime. To quote
the opinion rendered in the noted case, ". . . the petitioner in this case was
not afforded a speedy trial . . . [since] he was indicted June 23, 1950,...
[and] tried on June 29, 1954,-more than four years later."5  Yet the
court was bound by precedent to deny the writ of habeas corpus since in
Ohio, where an appeal or direct attack is or ever has been available, one
may not attack his conviction collaterally in a habeas corpus proceeding.6
As recently as May, 1960, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine
in State ex rel. Sheppard v. Alvis, Warden.7
However, in State ex rel. Bailey v. Henderson,8 a man was sentenced
to 20 years imprisonment after pleading "guilty," on the advice of counsel,
to a forgery indictment. His only crime was drawing a check with in-
I Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01.
2 This statement appears on p. 3 of the opinion in the noted case.
3 U.S. Const. amend. VI; "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial... ."
4 Ohio Const. art. 1, § 10: ". . . In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall
be allowed . . . a speedy public trial .... 
5 This statement appears on p. 1 of the opinion in the noted case.
6 In re Kramer, 163 Ohio St. 510, 127 N.E.2d 367 (1955) (denial of a constitutional
right in the trial); In re Knight, 144 Ohio St. 257, 58 N.E.2d 671 (1944) (denial of
jury trial) ; In re Whitmore, 137 Ohio St. 313, 29 N.E.2d 363 (1940) (trial court judge
absent during part of the trial) ; Ex parte Joseph Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426 (1874)
(the law had been changed to set a maximum sentence of 30 days for the prisoner's
crime) ; Ex parte McGehan, 22 Ohio St. 442 (1872) (failure to bring accused to trial
within the time limited by the criminal code).
7 State ex reL. Sheppard v. Alvis, Warden, 170 Ohio St. 551, 167 N.E.2d 94 (1960).
8 State ex rel. Bailey v. Henderson, 76 Ohio App. 547, 63 N.E.2d 830 (1945).
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sufficient funds, clearly not forgery. The time for appeal had long since
passed as he assumed that his attorney had correctly advised him; yet, in
the interest of preventing a gross miscarriage of justice, the Ohio Supreme
Court allowed him to successfully maintain a writ of habeas corpus. Why
the court has refused in recent years even to consider the Henderson case
is not clear.
Only four other states take the same view as Ohio.9 England 0 and
most other states have clearly allowed one to use the writ of habeas corpus
as the appropriate remedy in such cases. In those states allowing its use,
some permit it only if brought in the trial court" while others do not make
this restriction.'2
It is well established that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a
substitute to review errors of law or irregularities in the conduct of the trial;
this is the function of a direct appeal-not of a collateral attack by habeas
corpus proceedings. It appears, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court has
extended this principle to exclude the use of habeas corpus even to protect
one's constitutional rights. While there is a valid interest in limiting the
number of appeals and attacks which can be made against a conviction and
a concern in preventing overcrowding of our dockets, we also have a great
interest in preserving the fundamental rights guaranteed in the federal and
state constitutions. Moreover, we must be willing to go to great lengths to
preserve such rights. When a situation arises where one is clearly denied
such a right, it is very questionable that his mere failure to use a direct
attack by appeal within the time limited for such action should prevent
his use of habeas corpus when clear unconscionable situations would other-
wise result.
9 People v. Strassheim, 22S MI1. 581, 81 N.E. 1129 (1907); People v. Murphy, 212 11.
584, 72 N.E. 902 (1904); McGuire v. Wallace, 109 Ind. 284, 10 N.E. 111 (1886); In re
Spradlend, 38 Mo. 547 (1866) ; Ex parte Simonton, 9 Port. 390, 39 Am. Dec. 320 (1840).
10 Regina v. Bowen, 9 Car. & P. 509, 173 Eng. Rep. 933 (1840).
11 Cummins v. The People, 4 Colo. App. 71, 34 Pac. 734 (1893) ; Griswold v. State,
77 Fla. 505, 82 So. 44 (1919); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423 (1820); Com-
monwealth v. Lorin Carter, 28 Mass (11 Pick.) 277 (1831); Nixon v. State, 2 Smedes
& M. 497 (1844); State ex rel. Northrup v. Conrow, 13 Mont. 552, 35 Pac. 240 (1893);
United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880); Commonwealth ex rel. McGurk v. Superin-
tendent, 97 Pa. 211 (1881); Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 129 (1858); State v.
Williams, 35 S.C.L. 160, 14 S.E. 309 (1892); State v. Spergen, 12 S.C.L. 563 (1822);
State v. Stalnaker, 4 S.C.L. 44 (1806); Dulin v. Lillard, Sheriff, 91 Va. 718, 10 S.E. 821
(1895); State v. Brodie, 7 Wash. 442, 35 Pac. 137 (1893); Ex parte Blankenship, 93
IV. Va. 408, 116 S.E. 751 (1923); Ex parte Bracey, 82 W. Va. 69, 95 S.E. 593 (1918).
12 In re Ford, 160 Cal. 334, 116 Pac. 757 (1911); Ex parte Vinton, 5 Cal. Unrep.
624, 47 Pac. 1019 (1896); In re Miller, 66 Colo. 261, 180 Pac. 749 (1919); Crister v.
State, 87 Neb. 727, 127 N.W. 1073 (1910); Ex parte Larkin, 11 Nev. 90 (1876); Ex parte
Stanley, 4 Nev. 113, (1868) ; State v. Dilts, 76 NJ.L. 410, 69 At. 255 (Sup. Ct. 1908) ;
In re Blair, 32 Misc. 175, 65 N.Y. Supp. 640 (Sup. Ct. 1900); State ex rel. Adams v.
Larson, 12 ND. 474, 97 N.W. 537 (1903); People v. Jefferds, 5 Park Crim. Rep. 518
(N.Y. 1861); People v. Rulloff, 5 Park Crim. Rep. 77 (N.Y. 1860); In re Desolvers,
35 RI. 148, 86 At. 657 (1913); Rutherford v. State, 16 Tex. App. 649 (1884); EX
parte Cox, 12 Tex. App. 665 (1882); Harrall v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. App. R. 427 (1878).
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Exactly such a situation is present in the instant case. The petitioner
was clearly denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He did not
appeal his second conviction directly because at that time, he was in prison
serving the sentence from his first conviction. It was not until he was
"parolled" some two years later on the first conviction that he realized that
he had failed to appeal in time. It seems very unlikely that he was aware
of this requirement. Dut to the refusal of the Ohio Supreme Court to permit
habeas corpus to be employed in such a situation, the petitioner's constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial was clearly lost.
The United States Supreme Court appears to have recognized the need
to permit the use of habeas corpus in such situations. In Johnson v. Zerbst,
Warden,1 3 the court said, "True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities . . . occurring during the course
of the trial, and the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.
These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to preserve
-not destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty.")4
Although habeas corpus must be limited to prevent its use as a mere
substitute for a direct attack on a final determination of one's guilt, it is
often the ideal remedy-sometimes the only remedy-for one who has been
convicted while having been denied a basic constitutional right.' 5 The princi-
ple that habeas corpus is not a remedy for the review of mere errors or
irregularities at the trial should not be tantamount to constitutional safe-
guards of life and liberty. For this reason, it may well be time for the Ohio
Supreme Court to review its position on this question as was urged by the
common pleas judge in the instant case.
Edward F. Whipps
13 Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, 304 U.S. 458 (1838).
'4 Id., at 465 (emphasis added).
15 This statement appears on p. 5 of the opinion in the noted case.
